Abstract-Malware is increasingly sophisticated and affects the wellbeing of a large population of heterogeneous and highly connected devices. The users of these devices can make strategic and dynamic decisions to choose whether or not to adopt the antivirus software, not only to secure their individual devices but also to protect the network they are part of. Motivated by the strategic behaviors of the antivirus adoption, we establish an evolutionary Poisson game framework to capture the random, dynamic, and heterogeneous interactions of agents in a holistic fashion, and design mechanisms to control their behaviors to achieve a system-wide objective. We first prove the existence and uniqueness of a mixed Nash equilibrium of the large population game and show that the equilibrium is an evolutionary stable strategy. Finally, we develop online algorithms using the techniques of stochastic approximation coupled with the population dynamics, and they are shown to converge to the optimal solution of the controller problem. Numerical examples are used to illustrate and corroborate our results.
I. INTRODUCTION

E
MERGING engineering applications such as social networks [1] , crowdsourcing [2] , [3] and the Internet of Things (IoTs) [4] involve a large population of heterogeneous networked devices. The increasing connectivity provides convenience for information exchange and remote control. However, it also creates risks for sophisticated and stealthy malware to spread over the network. They can propagate over networks where users can adopt antivirus protection tools to deter or thwart the spreading. One illustrative example is 5G wireless communication networks [5] . Each mobile can communicate with a number of heterogeneous devices at different times, and makes an investment decision on antivirus software. This scenario is analogous to an epidemic scenario in which influenza propagates to healthy individuals when individuals interact in a close environment, and the protection a person can adopt is vaccination. In both scenarios, the objective from the perspective of the system designer or government Manuscript received September 14, 2016 ; revised January 16, 2017 and March 13, 2017; accepted March 14, 2017 . Date of publication March 27, 2017 ; date of current version May 8, 2017 . This work is partially supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) under Grants CNS1544782, EFRI1441140 and SES1541164. The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Dr. Sheng Zhong.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS.2017.2687883 agency is to control the large population behaviors and induce desirable outcome that is conducive to the sustainable growth of the population. To address this issue, the first step of this research is to establish an integrated system framework that allows capturing the random, dynamic and heterogeneous features of the population. One useful tool to describe the dynamic evolution of the population is evolutionary game theory [6] , [7] , which often assumes homogeneous and pairwise interactions between agents. This underlying assumption makes the classical framework insufficient to capture the network properties of the agents and the heterogeneous local interactions among the players. In this paper, we develop an evolutionary Poisson game framework which bridges the gap between the evolutionary game theory with the heterogeneity of the population. We enrich the game-theoretic model by incorporating individuals heterogeneity regarding types and also, the random number of individuals at each interaction, and the epidemic process to establish a holistic framework that can be used to address the engineering applications of interest. These unique aspects of the model lead to a customized evolutionary stability equilibrium concept, and its corresponding replicator dynamics for describing the evolution of the population.
The overarching goal of this work is to control the behaviors of the large population to achieve a system-wide objective. Building on the evolutionary Poisson game framework, we leverage the techniques of stochastic approximation to develop an online learning algorithm. Fig. 1 illustrates the interdependencies between the game-theoretic model and the controller. The controller observes the population states and inputs a control to drive the system to a global optimum.
The convergence analysis of the controller involves the understanding of the coupled dynamics of the population and the learning algorithm. We show that the convergence is guaranteed under time scale separation and mild conditions on the step sizes. Also, we use virus protection over a largescale network as a motivating application to illustrate the link between the game-theoretic model and the application. We fully characterize the global control of the virus protection problem in network systems and corroborate the results with numerical examples. We observe a phenomenon of heterogeneity induced confidence in which the protection rate decreases as heterogeneity of the population exceeds a certain threshold. In this work, we aim to address this issue by proposing an integrated framework that can be used to broaden the scope of the applications and capture more pertinent features of the problem. In particular, we focus on the large population and heterogeneity nature of the problem and the application to an epidemic protection game in which each node decides its level of protection. The main contributions of the paper are summarized as follows.
• We provide a generic mathematical framework for studying large heterogeneous networks in which strategic agents interact randomly, connecting the Poisson games and evolutionary game theory.
• We determine a control mechanism to control the global behavior of such heterogeneous system in order that the equilibrium satisfies global optimum conditions. • We provide a sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium for the optimal controller design and develop an online algorithm that is shown to converge to the desired equilibrium.
• Finally, we perform a complete analysis of the epidemic protection problem considering an homogeneous population and numerical experiments are used to highlight our theoretical results for the heterogenous setting. Interestingly, we observe that heterogeneity impacts the level of protection and introduce confidence principle in the behavior of the individuals.
A. Related Works
Large and infinite population behaviors have been investigated using models from evolutionary games [6] - [9] , Poisson games [10] , [11] , mean-field games [12] - [14] . These models have successfully captured different aspects of the large population. The Evolutionary Poisson Game developed in this work integrates the features of evolutionary games and Poisson games to form a more powerful framework to analyze and control systems with a large population of heterogeneous agents.
From the perspective of applications, the optimal protection problem and epidemics spreading over networks has been recently investigated for example in [15] . The existing models are not sufficient yet to incorporate the topological information into a holistic epidemic and game model simultaneously. Reference [16] shows the loss of efficiency if the investment decision is totally distributed in a network. A similar problem as been studied recently in [17] . The authors consider an epidemic containment game in which a node can protect its neighbors by protecting himself and, if a node is not protected, its cost depends on the epidemic threshold generated by the action of all the node in the network. The authors obtain several results for the Nash equilibrium and the price of anarchy in different random graph topologies, such as ErdosRenyi and power-law graphs.
Recently, game-theoretic solutions are proposed to the problem of controlling epidemic processes in a distributed way. For example in [18] , a non-cooperative epidemic containment game is proposed, and the goal is to provide the information on how many users are infected to help the decision of the nodes. The authors have combined the epidemic propagation of the worm with a game-theoretic description of the user behavior into a nonlinear dynamical system. One of their results shows that the learning rate of users has an impact on the proportion of nodes infected at equilibrium. Preciado et al. [19] consider a problem of controlling an epidemic outbreak by distributing resources throughout the network of contacts: antidote allocation and vaccination in each node. The goal of their paper is to determine, in a centralized manner, the costoptimal distribution of vaccines and antidotes to maximize the exponential decay rate of the infection disease, given a fixed total budget.
A similar problem has been studied in [20] where only the recovery rate of each node is determined in an optimal way to minimize the global infection rate. This study is also performed considering a centralized optimization problem. While in [21] , the authors consider a decentralized optimal protection strategy for each node depending on the global topology. The analysis of the Nash equilibrium is simplified by the fact of it being a potential game, and by considering a mean-field approximation of the SIS epidemic process. A learning-based distributed algorithm is proposed to determine a process that each can follow to reach an equilibrium situation. In our recent work [22] , we have provided a preliminary framework of the evolutionary Poisson games and a feedback control paradigm for epidemic control over networks. In this work, we rigorously show the existence and uniqueness of the ESS, provide a complete characterization of the virus protection of an homogeneous case, and show the sensitivity and convergence of the developed algorithm. We also extend the framework from the homogeneous setting to the heterogeneous cases to understand the impact of the population heterogeneity on the virus protection.
B. Organization of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows: In section II, we describe our new framework of evolutionary Poisson games, and we develop the equilibrium concept related to within the same section. We apply this framework to study an epidemic protection game in a large heterogeneous population in section III. We move forward the analysis in Section IV, by considering a global control problem, and we provide in section V explicit results that completely characterize a class of virus protection problem. Finally, we conclude the paper in section VI and discuss future works.
II. EVOLUTIONARY POISSON GAMES
In this section, we introduce first the basic framework of evolutionary game theory. Particularly, we define the concept of equilibrium which is defined as Evolutionary Stable Strategies and the replicator dynamics. Second, we explain how the idea of random number of interacting individuals can be considered as a static game like proposed in the framework of Poisson Games and finally, we describe our framework called Evolutionary Poisson Games (EPG) which combines evolutionary stability concept and random number of interacting individuals.
A. Evolution Game Theory Framework
Evolutionary game theory proposes an interesting framework to study large population behaviors. In this work, we consider that the population size is large so that the population size of the system can be considered to be infinite. The equilibrium concept in evolutionary games can be viewed as a refinement of the concept of Nash Equilibrium. This equilibrium concept is adapted to large population games, and it is called Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS). It is based on evolutionary principles that have been originally defined in [23] in biology, and recently applied to engineering and systems [9] , [24] - [26] . In this section, we introduce the concept of ESS and its associated dynamics. An ESS is described as a strategy profile such that, if adopted by all the players, is robust to deviations of a small fraction of the population. From a biological point of view, it can be seen as a generalization of Darwin's idea of survival of the fittest, while from a game theory perspective, it can be viewed as a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept which satisfies a stability property.
Consider an infinitely large population of players, where each player repeatedly meets a randomly selected individual within the population. This pairwise interaction framework is central in evolutionary game models, and this leads to a matrix game representation [6] . Each individual has a finite pure action space A = {a 1 , . . . , a K }, with the cardinality of set A is |A| = K . Let (A) = {p ∈ IR K + | a i ∈A p i = 1} be the set of mixed actions, that are probability measures over the action space. We define by U ( p, q) the expected payoff of an individual playing p against an opponent using q, where p, q ∈ (A). It is important to note that a mixed strategy p can also be interpreted as a distribution of pure strategies among all the individuals. This is also called the strategy profile of the population. Having this equivalent point of view of the game, an ESS, if adopted by the whole population, is by definition resistant to mutations of a small fraction of individuals in the population.
Definition 1: Suppose that the whole population adopts a strategy q, and that a fraction of mutants deviate to strategy p. Strategy q is an ESS if ∀ p = q in (A), there exists some p > 0 such that ∀ ∈ (0, p ):
(1) In other words, this strict inequality states that an ESS is robust to any small mutations (relative to ) of the population profile. In that sense, the equilibrium concept of ESS is said to be more robust than the Nash equilibrium because it is robust to the deviation of a fraction of players. Note that in Definition 1, ESS is defined in a general setting where individuals of a population minimize their cost function. When the expected payoff function is bilinear, the strict inequality condition (1) can be replaced equivalently by two conditions: one is that the equilibrium solution is a Nash equilibrium, and the second one is the stability condition.
Proposition 1 [6] : When the expected payoff function U (·, ·) is bilinear, a strategy q ∈ (A) is an ESS if and only if it satisfies the two following conditions:
It is important to note that an ESS is a Nash equilibrium due to the Nash condition above. Therefore, if a strategy profile that is not a Nash equilibrium cannot be an ESS. Another approach to study the evolutionary stability of an equilibrium in a population game is to consider the dynamics in time domain of the strategies adoption by each individual inside the population. The replicator dynamics, introduced in [27] , serve to highlight the role of selection from a dynamic perspective. It is formalized by a system of ordinary differential equations, and it establishes that the evolution of the size of the populations (the proportion of individuals playing a given pure strategy) depends on the utility obtained during pairwise interactions. Let the player's actions be pure strategies a i ∈ A := {a 0 , . . . , a K −1 }. The population profile at time t is given by the vector p(t) ∈ (A), and then for each a i ∈ A, p i (t) denotes the proportion of individuals that plays pure strategy (action) a i at time t. The replicator dynamics describe how the distribution of pure actions (the strategy profile) evolves in time depending on the interactions between individuals. We denote by e i the unit vector with the element equal to 1 at (i + 1) th position, i.e., e 0 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and e K −1 = (0, . . . , 0, 1). The strategy dynamics for any action (pure strategy) a i ∈ A are expressed by the following equations: (2) where U (e i , p(t)) is the immediate utility of an individual playing i against the population profile p(t) and
is the average immediate utility of the population. A strategy will sustain if its utility is lower than the utility averaged over all the strategies used in the whole population. Recall that we deal with utility function, and not fitness, then each individual looks for minimizing its utility. The folk theorem of evolutionary games allows to establish a strict connection between the stable points of the replicator dynamics and the Nash equilibria of the game [8] .
B. Random Number of Interacting Individuals
Large scale systems with strategic decision makers often involve a random number of interacting players. Evolutionary game framework is important for studying the equilibrium of large scale games but it suffers widely from the assumption of limited pairwise interactions. This issue has been addressed in [28] which studies the concept of revision protocols to alleviate the assumption. In fact, the payoff of each agent, which is used as an input for the agent to revise his action, is generic and defined as a function that depends on the population profile. If this function is generated by a single round of random matching, then we obtain the standard pairwise interaction assumption, which is commonly used in most of evolutionary game models. In the case where, at each interaction, an individual competes against the population as a whole instead of an individual, then we are faced with a playing-the-field model proposed by Maynard-Smith [29] . Note that our EPG framework is different from the above mentioned models in the sense that, at each interaction, each individual interacts with a random number of individuals modeled by a Poisson process. Hence the framework captures the uncertainties of the size of interactions an individual can have, which play an important role in epidemic spreading over networks. Moreover, a large heterogeneous population where individuals may differ one from each other is also an important challenge for using standard evolutionary game framework. We then propose to generalize the interaction framework to a random number of individuals and also to consider an heterogeneous population. Poisson game is a natural framework to capture these features [10] . This type of random number of player game has been recently successfully used to study decentralized resource allocation in networks [30] , [31] . The number of players involved in a local interaction follow a Poisson process with rate λ, typically λ >> 1. We denote by := {1, . . . , T } is the set of types of players and each one belongs to one type τ ∈ . The probability of a player being of type τ is given by r (τ ), and then the number of players of type τ in each local interaction is a Poisson random variable with parameter λr (τ ). In standard Poisson Games defined by Myerson [10] , the utility of an individual depends on the number of players that choose the same action and not on their type. We describe here a more general version with type-dependent utility function. We define the (local) utility u τ (a, x) of a player of type τ playing action a ∈ A against x = (x 1 , . . . , x T ) where for each type τ , x τ is a vector of size K , where x τ (b) is the number of players of type τ who choose action b ∈ A. Note that x can be also described as a type/action matrix of size T × K . The expected utility of a player of type τ who plays action a ∈ A while the rest of the players are expected to play using strategy
with for all type τ ∈ , σ τ ∈ (A)) is given by:
where x ∈ (Z (A)) T and Z (A) denotes the set of elements w ∈ IN K such that w(c) is a non negative integer for all c ∈ A (w(c) represents the number of players choosing action c).
The relation between σ and x is given through the following decomposition property of the Poisson distribution:
where players play according to the mixed strategy σ . Here, for any type τ ∈ , σ τ (b) is the probability that a player of type τ chooses the pure action b ∈ A. Thus, the vector σ τ can be seen as the strategy profile for type-τ individuals. Therefore, the expected utility of type τ player choosing pure action a can be seen as an infinite number of successive interactions with different individuals where the number of individuals at each interaction is a random Poisson variable. We can also compare this expected utility measure by considering that at the same instant, many local interactions occur inside an infinite population of heterogeneous players. Then, the expected utility whether a type-τ player chooses a mixed strategy θ ∈ (A) is given by:
In the standard evolutionary game, we may consider that each individual can revise its action based on different mechanisms, called revision protocols [28] . In our framework, each individual adopts one revision mechanism but interacts with different numbers of opponents each time. It is possible to extend the framework to allow individuals to adopt different revision protocols, which would be one future work that can enrich the model. Note that we use the concept of Poisson games to define the local interaction framework inside an evolutionary game setting with a heterogeneous population of strategic individuals. Then, we call this new large heterogeneous population as Evolutionary Poisson Games (EPG). We describe in the next section this new framework and the evolutionary stable strategy in this context.
C. Evolutionary Poisson Games (EPG)
Each local interaction involves a random number of player which follows a Poisson process. Then, the expected utility given by Equation (3) defines the expected utility of any player of type τ ∈ that plays pure action a ∈ A inside the infinite large heterogeneous population. Thus, our framework is related to evolutionary game theory in the sense that several local interactions are considered in order to determine an equilibrium state of the strategies inside the population. However, our formulation is more general as we consider a random number of individuals at each local interaction instead of a fixed number of individuals in evolutionary game framework. By the way, we will be able to study the evolutionary stability of the equilibrium, which is a more robust concept of equilibrium than the Nash equilibrium. More, this stability notion is of importance when the number of players is very large, as it is the case in our framework. The EPG framework is described in Fig. 2 where several Poisson games are in interaction at a population level as in an evolutionary game.
In order to study and to control optimally a large heterogeneous population of strategic individuals, we propose a new game framework which is built on evolutionary stability concept and Poisson games interaction setting. Then, compared to standard evolutionary games, our framework differs in two aspects. First, we consider a random number of individuals in each local interaction, and secondly, each individual has his own type. A similar analysis of the evolutionary stability with a random number of individuals at each local interaction has been proposed in [9] . But the authors simplify the ESS condition as their utility function is bilinear, and moreover, they do not consider different types of individuals. Considering these two main differences, we define the concept of ESS in our EPG framework based on the standard ESS definition but considering the different types of individuals and the expected utility.
Definition 2:
. . , θ * T ). In other words, an ESS has to be robust to a deviation of part of the population for each type τ . The fact that our system is composed for different types of individuals leads the definition of ESS more complex than in standard evolutionary games. Moreover, we can extend the replicator dynamics concept given by equation (2) to our EPG framework. In fact, if we denote by p(t) the strategy σ of all the individuals in the heterogeneous population at time t, i.e. for all type τ p τ (t) = σ τ (t), we have the replicator dynamics for our EPG: ∀τ ∈ , ∀a i ∈ A, (4) where p i,τ (t) is the proportion of type-τ individuals that play action a i ∈ A at time t. We have that for all type τ and time t, p τ (t) ∈ (A). Then, for each action a i ∈ A we have that the proportion p i (t) of individuals that play this action at time t is given by:
The first difference between the ESS in an EPG and the ESS definition for standard evolutionary game theory is that the robustness condition should be satisfied for all types of individuals. The second difference is that the utility takes into account a number of individuals interacting in each local interaction follows a Poisson distribution. Generally speaking, proving that a mixed Nash equilibrium is an ESS is not a trivial task in standard evolutionary games.
In the next section, we apply our EPG framework to the control of an epidemic protection in a heterogeneous population. Despite the fact that the utility of the game is not bilinear, we still can show that the equilibrium obtained is an ESS for our EPG. Our framework is generic enough, and it can be applicable to the control of large complex systems, such as virus spreading [32] and information cascading [33] . To illustrate the EPG framework, we describe in the next section, our model for the controlled of an inhomogeneous Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) over a large population.
III. EPIDEMIC PROTECTION IN HETEROGENEOUS POPULATION
Having defined the population game involving heterogeneous interacting randomly individuals, we describe one important application of this EPG framework related to virus protection. Many recent works have disregarded the topology of the interaction, the heterogeneity of the individuals or the selfishness of individual decisions in their models. In this work, we develop a holistic framework that can incorporate all these features. We start by introducing an SIS epidemic model, which has been well studied in the literature [34] and has recently gained lots of interests for modeling computer virus propagation [32] and [35] . In a recent survey [36] on propagation models of worms in networks, compartmental models like SI, SIS and SIR have been used as primary frameworks for modeling worm and virus propagation in networks.
We consider an individual protection strategic game where each player has a type, or private information which determines his recovery capability (e.g. the rate of recovery), and incomplete information (e.g. nodes are not aware of the number of players they interact with). 1 Each player determines his level of protection corresponding to action a ∈ A, and its utility depends on whether or not the epidemic threshold is reached, which is a function of the actions of the other players involved in the interaction. Note that the number of player in a local interaction is a random number.
In practical applications, the statistics of the network connectivity can be measured as in [37] and [38] and used as an input for the model to obtain the parameters for the Poisson process. The rate of infection can be estimated by historical data by curve fitting local observations at multiple nodes. This problem has been studied in the literature as an inverse problem for parameter estimation, for example [39] , [40] . The cost parameters can be obtained by assessing the impact of the virus infection, which has been studied in the literature as in [41] and [42] . The knowledge of these parameters will lead to the practical applications of the framework for the purposes of analytical risk assessment and adaptive control of the epidemics. This work builds on the knowledge of the system parameters and focuses on the development of the analysis and design methodologies.
A. Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible Epidemic Dynamics
Several epidemic dynamics are proposed in the literature but the SIS model is one of the most studied. This epidemic model is described as follows. We consider a graph composed of N nodes. Such graph represents a local interaction involving N individuals. In an in-homogeneous SIS model, an infected node i contaminates neighbors at rate β i by sending infectious packet to randomly selected neighbors. The spreading of malware can be achieved through emailing, network scanning, messaging over social networks or P2P networks. Successful infection relies on techniques such as social engineering, exploiting network configuration errors, and exploiting loopholes in operating system and application security [43] . If a neighbor of node i that is uninfected but susceptible to infection receives an infectious packet, then that host becomes infected. The remaining time for which the node i is infected follows an exponential process with rate δ i . After being recovered from the infection, each healthy node becomes susceptible again, and can be again infected. The parameters β i and δ i can be often obtained through data analytics, see for example [44] , [45] . In this work, we assume that the parameters are given and the focus is on the system analysis and the decision-making using these parameters.
Considering an SIS epidemics over a graph, there exists a limiting spreading factor rate, denoted by the critical epidemic threshold, below which the infection vanishes exponentially fast in time, and above which the critical threshold the network stays infected. In an in-homogeneous SIS epidemics, we can express the epidemic threshold of an individual depending on the effective spreading rate. We consider without loss of generalities that the contamination rate β i for each node i does not depend on the node nor on its type, i.e., for all node i , β i = β. Note that our spreading framework is in-homogeneous as we consider that each node of type τ has a recovery exponential process with rate δ τ , which is privately known to the node itself. Then, for each node i of type τ , the effective spreading rate is defined by the following ratio ρ i,τ = β δ τ := ρ τ . An example of an heterogeneous contamination process in a local interaction involving 4 nodes with 3 different types is depicted in Fig. 3 . The epidemic threshold for a general topology and non-homogeneous SIS epidemic process does not have a closed-form expression. However, this threshold depends on the effective spreading rate of each node, the topology and the action of each node.
It is has been shown in [46] by using a mean-field approximation of the Markov process model for the epidemic, for the complete graph structure with N nodes, a necessary and sufficient condition on the spreading factor vector such that the disease or virus propagates or not in the network. The authors have shown that the in-homogeneous SIS epidemic propagates in a complete graph if and only if the spreading rate vector ρ = (ρ 1,t , . . . , ρ N,t ) satisfies the following inequality:
Players are characterized by their recovery rate δ τ which depends on their type τ . Based on the previous result, we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition over the effective spreading rates ρ τ and the number of nodes x τ of type τ , in order for the infection to propagate in a local interaction as a complete graph.
Proposition 2 [46] : Considering a complete graph with T types of nodes and an in-homogeneous SIS epidemic model with effective spreading rate ρ τ for each type τ . The virus propagates to all the nodes if and only if the following condition holds:
where x τ is the number of type τ nodes. This inequality is equivalent to the following constraint:
B. Equilibrium Analysis
In order to derive explicit solutions and insights of our new framework, we consider for the rest of the paper that the set of pure actions of the players is A = {a 0 , a 1 }, and the set Z (A) = IN 2 . Depending on the decision of each player, if the infection is propagated over the entire network, then the cost for a player that does not protect itself (choose action a = a 0 ) is C 0 , otherwise its cost is 0. This cost may represent the restoring cost when a node is contaminated, or also this cost can be a penalty proposed by the system designer in order to control self-protection behavior. Then, the utility of a player is given by:
The utility function in a Poisson game should depend on the total number of players choosing the same action over different types. In the model, we do not have such aggregative assumption in the utility and the type as an impact on the utility function. For the same number of individuals that do not invest, i.e., take the action a 0 , the utility of a player depends on the number of such individuals of each type. We then use the concept of a random player game model proposed in [47] , which is a generalization of Poisson games. In fact, games with a random number of players are a natural extension of Bayesian games, which are a class of incomplete information games [48] .
We denote by X τ the random variable which determines the number of players of type τ that do not invest. Based on the decomposition property of the Poisson distribution, (τ )σ τ (a 0 ) . Then, the total number of players who do not invest follows a Poisson distribution with parameter λ τ r (τ )σ τ (a 0 ). If a node decides to be protected, he pays a costC, i.e., 1 , (x 1 , . . . , x T ) ) =C.
u(a
We consider a symmetric equilibrium in the sense that all players of the same type are identical and interchangeable. Also, as we can see in the definition of the utility function, the type of a user does not impact its utility. Then, this observation makes some implications and we can omit type-dependent utilities and equilibrium. 2 Denote by p the probability that a player (of any type) chooses action a 0 , i.e., for all types τ = 1, . . . , T , σ τ (a 0 ) = p and σ τ (a 1 ) = 1 − p. As we only have 2 actions, we can restrict our analysis to only a single action and we have the following definition of the expected utility function.
Definition 3: In our EPG, the expected utility of any player who plays pure action a 0 while all other players are expected to play according to a mixed strategy p is given by:
Note that the expected utility depends on the realization vector
. . , X T ).
Based on the decomposition and aggregation properties of the Poisson distribution, we obtain:
Then, the expected utility of a player that does not invest in protection, in face of a population profile p, is given by:
Finally, the expected utility of a player from playing mixed strategy q ∈ (A) against a population profile p ∈ (A) is given by:
A (symmetric) mixed equilibrium p * for our protection game within an EPG framework, satisfies the following bestresponse condition:
This simple best-response condition yields to the following lemma. Lemma 1: IfC ≥ C 0 , then the equilibrium p * of our EPG G is pure and given by p * = 1.
Proof: The proof of this lemma follows the intuition that if the cost for being protected,C, is higher than the cost of being 2 A similar analysis can be done for the case of type-dependent equilibrium ( [49] ). infected, C 0 , then every user, whatever his type is, will take the risk of infection state. In this case, the infection cost C 0 is less or equal to the protection costC. To state if more formally, for any population profile p ∈ (A) the utility of any individual that chooses protection is U (a 1 , p) =C. For any population profile p ∈ (A), the utility of any individual that chooses not to be protected is:
Then, if we haveC ≥ C 0 , then for all individuals:
Thus, the strategy a 0 is a dominant strategy, and all individuals play this action at equilibrium. The usual bilinearity assumption of the utility function in standard evolutionary games implies that strict Nash equilibrium is an ESS. However, it is not the case in our context, as our utility function is not bilinear. We next state the proposition that describes the mixed equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (Existence and Uniqueness of Mixed Nash Equilibrium):
If the parameters of the system λ, C 0 ,C (with C < C 0 ), T , the type distribution r (·) and the effective spreading rates ρ τ satisfy the following condition:
then, there exists one unique mixed equilibrium for our EPG G. Proof: A mixed equilibrium p * ∈ (A) satisfies the bestresponse condition:
which is equivalent to:
Then, we study the solutionp of the equation:
Note that both functions are continuous, strictly increasing over the interval [0, 1] and also we have:
The function G(·) is strictly convex over the interval [0, 1]. Also the same for the function F(·) which is a finite sum of strictly convex functions and then it is a strictly convex function over the interval [0, 1]. Then, if F(1) < G(1), there exists almost one solution of equation (7) inside the interval (0, 1). More as the left-hand side function is a polynom and the right-hand side an exponential, the solution of equation (7) over [0, 1] is unique. Then, if
there exists one unique mixed equilibrium for our EPG G. We have shown the existence and uniqueness of the mixed Nash equilibrium depending on the parameters of the problem.
We have now the last possible case leading to the pure equilibrium p * = 0 (all individuals decide to be protected).
Proposition 4: If the parameters of the system λ, C 0 ,C (withC < C 0 ), T , the type distribution r (·) and the effective spreading rates ρ τ satisfy the following condition:
then, the pure equilibrium is p * = 0. Proof: Considering the previous functions:
we assume that F(1) > G (1) . Moreover, we have proved previously that F(0) > G(0) and that those functions are strictly convex over the compact set [0, 1]. More, function F is a polynom and function G is an exponential and therefore, the curves cannot crossed each other over the interval. Then, p) . Thus, the action a 1 is the best one for every individual whatever the decision of the other (for all p). Finally, we can then conclude that taking action a 1 ( p * = 0) is a (pure) Nash equilibrium.
We have now the following corollary.
Corollary 1:
The equilibrium p * is strictly decreasing in the costC and is also strictly decreasing with the average number of interacting individuals λ in each local interaction.
Based on a geometric argument, as function F and G are continuous over the interval [0, 1], we can show that more expensive is the protection, fewer individuals will adapt the action a 0 , and it also is strictly decreasing with the average number λ of individuals in each local interaction. Indeed, having more people in average at each interaction makes individuals more vulnerable, and then the protection rate (i.e., the proportion of individuals protected) becomes higher at the equilibrium. A last important remark from the previous proposition is that the action a 1 cannot be a dominant strategy for any values of the parameters of the model. In fact, F(0) > G(0), and there is always a proportion of individuals that are not protected.
C. Replicator Dynamics
The analysis of the equilibrium can be performed by studying the replicator dynamics of our EPG. As we have seen in previous section, the framework of Poisson games is related to Evolutionary games in the sense that many local interactions occur in a large population of individuals. In our context, the replicator dynamics equations can be formalized as follows:
We have the results from the folk theorem of the replicator dynamics [8] in population games that an interior rest point of the dynamics is an equilibrium of our game. Then, we have another method to describe the equilibrium, as a rest point of a dynamical system. This provides a very important insight for a global control of the system. We will see in the next section, that this approach gives us the possibility to determine a two time-scale process to optimize a global performance of the system without computing explicitly the equilibrium. Moreover, we prove in the next proposition that any rest point of our dynamics is not only an equilibrium but also an ESS. In our setting, we have the following result.
D. Existence and Uniqueness of ESS
Based on the previous description of the replicator dynamics, we can prove the existence and uniqueness of ESS for our particular game. The above proposition is based on the previous proposition related to existence and uniqueness of mixed equilibrium. In fact, an ESS is a mixed Nash equilibrium that is robust to invasion of mutants in part of the population.
Proposition 5: If our EPG G has a unique mixed equilibrium p * (i.e., the parameters of the game satisfy the condition described in proposition 3), then it is an ESS of our EPG.
Proof: Based on Proposition (4), we first assume that there exists a mixed equilibrium p * , and we have shown in Proposition (4) that it is unique. Moreover, the equilibrium is a unique interior rest point of the replicator dynamics:
In fact, we have that U (a 0 , p * ) =C and then p * is a rest point of the dynamics. In order to prove that p * is an ESS, we choose an arbitrary mixed strategy q adopted by a proportion of individuals in the population. Then, based on (1), p * is an ESS if there exists an q such that ∀ ∈ (0, q ), we have:
In fact, we can show this inequality with q = 1. We first assume w.l.o.g. that 0 < q < p * . A similar analysis can be done for the case when 1 > q > p * . We fix ∈ (0, 1), and we denote p = q + (1 − ) p * . Note that q ≤ p < p * . If = 0, there is no mutant, and it is a trivial case using algebraic decompositions, we have the following equivalence:
which can be rewritten as:
This is equivalent to
As the mixed equilibrium p * is unique, and is the unique interior rest point of the replicator dynamics, for all p < p * (resp. p > p * ) we have thatṗ(t) > 0 (resp.ṗ(t) < 0). We have that p < p * , and thenṗ (t) > 0 which, based on the replicator dynamics o.d.e. (8), indicates that for any time t:
Finally, as it is true for any time t, it is also true for any value p such that q ≤ p < p * , and then:
which implies that p * is an ESS. Finally, we have proved at the beginning that this mixed equilibrium is unique, then p * is the unique ESS. The last proposition then proves that if the parameters of the game satisfy a given condition, then the ESS exists and is unique. Moreover, it corresponds to the unique interior rest point of the ODE (8) . This result is well-known as the folk theorem of evolutionary game theory [7] and can be also directly applied here in our EPG framework. The discrete-time version of the replicator dynamics is described as follows:
Let the time scale parameter β(n) be n β(n) = ∞ and
then, as n tends to infinity, the discrete-time iteration (9) yields an approximation of the continous-time replicator dynamics given by (8) .
E. Sensitivity Analysis of the Equilibirum
In this section, we study the sensitivity analysis of the ESS with respect to a perturbation of the priceC. The problem of sensitivity analysis is to numerically approximate a new equilibrium solution resulting from a variety of parameter perturbations. This helps particularly to study robustness of an equilibrium that can be used to predict perturbed equilibrium in response to control changes. This method requires the calculation of derivatives of decision variables and constraint multipliers with respect to perturbation parameters. In our setting, we can obtain an explicit formulation of the derivatives of the ESS with respect to the price. We summarize in the Appendix, the general framework of the sensitivity analysis proposed in [50] . We consider our system depicted on Fig. 1 as the following minimization problem:
In fact, the controller determine the cost C based on the equilibrium p * observed. Therefore, in order to determine the optimal cost C, the controller aims to understand how the equilibrium reacts to the control parameter, which is the aim of this sensitivity analysis. The problem [C P] is convex as the objective function is composed of the integral of a nondecreasing function and a linear function, since its domain is a compact set, attains its optimum. A solution p * of this convex minimization problem is clearly an equilibrium as the firstorder optimality conditions are equivalent to indifference conditions of Nash equilibrium, i.e., U (a 0 , p * ) =C. Then, we can apply the sensitivity analysis using Fiacco's theorem [50] with the previous convex minimization problem to determine the sensitivity of the equilibrium with respect to an important parameter of our model which is the cost C. This result is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Fiacco's Theorem, [50] 
The sensitivity analysis considering the following objective function:
gives the following result:
.
Proof:
We consider the following convex minimization problem:
We consider a particular value C 0 ∈ IR + of the control variable, and we denote by p 0 = p * (C 0 ) the equilibrium corresponding with this value. The Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the point ( p 0 , C 0 ) are denoted by ν * 1 and ν * 2 . We choose C 0 such that the equilibrium is non-degenerate, i.e. p 0 ∈]0, 1[. Then, all the conditions of the Fiacco's theorem [50] are satisfied. In fact, for all ( p, C) in the neighborhood of ( p 0 , C 0 ), the functions f , g 1 and g 2 are twice continuously differentiable. Also, we have shown in Proposition 4 the uniqueness of the equilibrium solution for a given controlC then the second order sufficient condition hold at C. We have that the gradients of the constraints are obviously linearly independent and finally, the control parameter C is such that the equilibrium is non degenerate, i.e. p 0 ∈]0, 1[, and then the Lagrange multipliers ν * 1 and ν * 2 are equal to 0. Thus, the sensitivity analysis theorem of Fiacco [50] and the sensitivity of the equilibrium p 0 in C with respect to a small perturbation ofC can be applied. The Lagrangian function is:
and the first order Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions forC = C and ( p,
and
As we have a non-degenerate equilibrium (ν * 1 = ν * 2 = 0), the first KKT condition gives:
Then, taking the derivatives with respect to p, that gives M(C), or with respect toC, that gives N(C ), we obtain:
Then, the sensitivity analysis gives the following result:
Based on the results obtained related to the equilibrium, the dynamics and the sensitivity analysis, we are able to perform a global control on this heterogeneous strategic population in order to achieve an optimal goal.
IV. ONLINE GLOBAL CONTROL
The overarching goal of this work is to design a global control for the entire heterogeneous, stochastic interacting population. As an example of global objective function for the controller (see Fig. 1 ), we consider in this section the global revenue. Moreover, we propose an online learning process as we assume that the infected cost C 0 is not known by the controller. This parameter is highly related to how individuals evaluate the cost of being infected, or by definition, it is difficult to estimate it correctly. We then propose an online learning algorithm so that a controller can optimize a global function of the equilibrium population without knowing this parameter. We use the average revenue as a global function given by
where p * (C) is the equilibrium considering the control parameterC. Its goal is to maximize this function depending on the priceC. Based on simulations displayed in Section V, we observe that the revenue R(C) is strictly concave over the interval [0, C 0 ], and then a gradient algorithm can be used to determine the optimal priceC * that maximizes the revenue of the provider. In fact, we have existence and uniqueness of an optimal price. An approximate gradient algorithm is designed to estimate the gradient function of the revenue since there is no closed form expression of the equilibrium function. We then propose to use the following Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation (SPSA) [51] :
where ζ is a random variable such that IP(ζ = 1) = IP(ζ = −1) = 1 2 , and k is a small constant. One sample form (only one evaluation of the objective function each step) of this approximation is proposed in [52] . However, it has been observed that this single form introduces significant bias, so that in general the two-sample form (two evaluations of the objective function), given by equation (10), is considered.
Since the equilibrium of the population game is characterized by the rest point of the replicator dynamic given by equation (8) , the controller can set a new price (C + kζ ) to optimize his revenue, and wait for convergence of the replicator dynamics to the equilibrium. Therefore, by observing the equilibrium, the controller has an estimate of its new revenue and also of the gradient of his revenue. Given that for a fixed priceC, the replicator dynamics have a global asymptotically stable equilibrium p * (C), our algorithm converges to the optimal price. Considering an initial price C(0), we then consider the following approximate gradient descent algorithm, ∀n = 0, 1, . . .:
where α(n) is the update step size, a discrete random variable ζ n at each step n such that
We can then define for all n the following functions:
Then, the approximate stochastic gradient descent can be written as:
where M n is a martingale difference sequence. The update step-size parameter α(n) has to be efficiently designed in order to guarantee the convergence to the global optimal solution. Indeed, the control update has to wait for the convergence of the replicator dynamics to the equilibrium. Therefore, there is a relation between the speeds of the two dynamical processes. For a fixedC, the equilibrium p * (C) is a global attractor, which is also a global asymptotically stable equilibrium of the replicator dynamics. Indeed, the SPSA is coupled with the replicator dynamics. Let be a positive constant, and the RD equation is rewritten aṡ
By having small enough, the SPSA views the replicator dynamics as quasi-equilibrated while the replicator dynamics view the SPSA as quasi-static. Then, we can study as a two time-scale dynamical system the convergence of our SPSA by viewing the underlying replicator dynamics. For a sufficiently large speed of convergence of the replicator dynamics compared to the stochastic gradient descent, we can prove that our SPSA algorithm converges to the price that optimizes the global objective function. The step size of strategy update of the population is 1 n in discrete time. We need that the gradient step-size α(n) tends to zero at a higher rate than 1 n . This implies that the stochastic gradient descent moves at a slower timescale than the replicator dynamics. Then, we have the following proposition that yields the conditions on the stepsize update of the gradient algorithm for reaching the optimal solution.
Proposition 7: If we have the following conditions:
Proof: On one side, the approximate gradient descent algorithm follows, ∀n = 0, 1, 2, . . .:
where the reward depends on the equilibrium asR(C(n)) = λ (1 −p(C(n)))C(n) and α(n) is the step size of the updating rule. On the other side, the replicator dynamics given by equation (8) can be seen as the limit of a discrete-time iteration with an update stepsize 1/n. Then, the two discrete-time iterations are coupled as in [53] . Then, in order to have the convergence of the coupled iteration processes, we need the following conditions: i) sup n (||C(n)||) < ∞, a.s., ii) for fixed C, the replicator dynamics o.d.e has a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium p * (C), iii) the o.d.e limit of the approximate gradient algorithm has a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium when replacing the equilibrium by p * (C), iv) the step size α(n) satisfies the following:
The first condition is verified as ifC > C 0 then p * = 1, thus we have that for all n, ||C(n)|| < C 0 and then ||R(C(n))|| < λC 0 . Thus, we have:
and then sup n (||C(n)||) < ∞. The second condition is verified as the replicator dynamics rest point, for a fixed C, is an interior ESS in our case, and then a global globally asymptotically stable equilibrium (see [7, Th. 7] ). Based on the assumption that the revenue function is strictly concave, there is a unique maximizer, and then the limit of the stochastic gradient has a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium. This verifies the third O.D.E condition. Finally, the assumption (iv) on the step size implies that the gradient update moves on the slower time-scale than the replicator dynamics. Thus, we have the almost sure convergence of our approximate gradient descent algorithm given by equation (11) to the optimal price, i.e. C(n) a.s. −→ C * . The last proposition provides conditions on the time scale of the gradient algorithm to ensure that the coupled algorithm converges to the optimal solution of the global control problem.
V. COMPLETE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE VIRUS PROTECTION GLOBAL CONTROL PROBLEM
In this section, we first provide a complete characterization of the solutions to the global control problem for the population of one single type. Second, we show the impact of heterogeneity and randomness of our system on the equilibrium results and the global control problem.
A. Population With Single Type
Consider a fully connected network of size x (x nodes all interconnected to each other), and all the players are of the same type. Hence ρ i = ρ = β δ and the value of the epidemic threshold ρ c is exactly equal to:
when x > 1 is the number of nodes that do not invest. The special cases where x = 1 and x = 0 are not representative of our problem since, there are no propagation effects in these two cases. The utility function for a node that does not invest can be simplified into
The value x is not known by every node, but it follows a Poisson distribution with rate λ. We denote byp the solution to the following equation
The strategy a 0 is dominant if C 0 ≤C as stated in Lemma (1). Next, we investigate the case where C 0 >C. Note that if the effective spreading rate is sufficiently large, i.e., ρ = β δ > 1, then, we can find the equilibrium given by:
This solution is not 0 since there is a very small probability that an individual is not infected. However, this value becomes close to 0 as λ increases. Proposition 8: If the effective spreading rate is high enough but not too much, i.e., 1/2 < ρ ≤ 1, then we have the unique equilibrium given by: 
This equation can be equivalently rewritten as:
This equation is the following transcendental algebraic equation:
with the following constants:
, and r = − 1 λ .
Then, the solution is given by:
which gives:
In the case where ρ ≤ 1/2, we have the following description of the equilibrium p * :
The solutionp is in fact the solution of the so-called Generalized Lambert W function [54] :
where c > 0 is a constant and P N (x) and Q M (x) are polynomials in x of respectively orders N and M. Though this equation cannot be solved in its general form (approximations are possible for simple cases [55] ), it provides an interesting link between gravity theory and quantum mechanics [56] .
B. Population With Multiple Types
We consider 2 types of individuals in a population, i.e., T = 2. Note that the analysis can be without loss of generality performed with a larger size of T . The two-type case provides a convenient way to visualize the results and gives insights. We then have r (1) := r (i.e., the proportion of type-1 individuals in the population) and r (2) := 1 − r (i.e., the proportion of type-2 individuals). Individuals from each type differ in their capacity (e.g. recovery rate ρ) to recover from the virus. We let ρ 1 < ρ 2 , which means that δ 1 > δ 2 , i.e., type-1 individuals are more resilient to the virus and it takes generally less time for them to react and then to recover.
1) Equilibrium Paradox:
When r is close to 0 (resp. 1), i.e., only type-2 (resp. type-1) individuals form the population, we observe in Fig. 4 the impact of both heterogeneity parameters λ and the type distribution r (·) on the equilibrium. Specifically, for the reason of convenience, we show the percentage of people protecting themselves (i.e., the protection rate) which corresponds to 1 − p * . We can observe that the average number of interacting individuals, which is equal to λ, has a positive impact on the protection rate inside the population. For the same heterogeneity type given by a distribution r (·), the protection rate is strictly increasing with λ. It is obvious that, when each individual interacts with more individuals in average, it makes individuals more vulnerable to the contagion, and then requires a higher level of protection. Comparing λ = 2 (e.g. a population with mostly pairwise interactions as in standard evolutionary game framework) and λ = 10, we can observe that the protection rate is strictly higher only when the proportion of type-2 individuals is higher than around 80%. This means that under this threshold type proportion, individuals do not feel in a risky environment even if the number of interacting individuals is large (i.e., λ = 10). When λ becomes even larger another interesting property arises. From Fig. 4 , we can observe that, for parameter λ = 20, the impact of the heterogeneity type is significant. By increasing the heterogeneity from r = 0 (only type-2 individuals), the protection rate decreases. In fact, increasing the heterogeneity in our scenario means that we reduce the proportion of type-2 individuals meanwhile increasing the proportion of type-1 individuals.
As we further increase the value r , the phenomenon of heterogeneity induced confidence principle arises. A more heterogeneous population leads to a decreasing the protection rate as the heterogeneity reaches the percentage value around 20 % of type-2. Moreover, this threshold seems to be independent of the average number of individuals in each local interaction.
We can explain this counter-intuitive outcome by considering the particular case with λ = 30 and with two different effective spreading rate for type-1 individuals. This scenario is depicted on Fig. 5 . Here, we can observe that the behavior of the protection rate is as expected, always decreasing when increasing the proportion of type-2 individuals. This is obtained when the effective spreading rate of type-1 individuals is equals to 0.1. In the other case, when ρ 1 = 0.05 even if more type-2 individuals are in the population, the global protection rate is decreasing as more heterogeneity is introduced. Individuals behave more confidently and protect less themselves. 3 2) Convergence of the Replicator Dynamics: In Fig. 6 , the replicator dynamics equation is illustrated for two different starting points and also for different values of the average interaction size λ. This result confirms the convergence of the ODE to the equilibrium and also that the equilibrium is decreasing with the parameter λ. In fact, the protection rate is by definition the proportion of individuals that are protected, i.e., 1 − p * . Then, we can observe on Fig. 6 that for r = 0.1 and λ = 10, the protection rate of the population is 0.13, which corresponds to the rest point of the replicator dynamics in long dashed line. This result is corroborated for the case where λ = 20 and the protection rate is then 0.56, we obtain that the replicator dynamics converge to 0.44.
3) Global Optimization and Learning Algorithm: Finally, we illustrate the global control design problem. We first describe in Fig. 7 the global revenue for the controller as a function of his control parameter, and observe the strict concavity property. Moreover, we observe the uniqueness of the maximum.
We show now the results of our learning mechanism for several control updates with step size α(n) = 1 n 2 , α(n) = 1 n 0.66 and α(n) = 1 1+n log (n) . We consider two starting prices C 0 = 1 and C 0 = 3. Note that the optimal price is C * = 2.58.
The control update α(n) = 1 n 2 displayed in Fig. 8 gives a too fast timescale update of the control and finally converges to a 3 Note that the choice of the parameter ρ 1 is in accordance with the values of contamination rates considered in [57] and [58] . control value which is far from the optimal one, and therefore, the revenue at this value is far from the optimal revenue. The second control update displayed in Fig. 9 satisfies the conditions in Proposition 7. We observe that for this control update, our learning algorithm does not converge to the optimal control but the solution given by the algorithm is close to the optimal one and stochastically oscillates around it.
Finally, we observe on Fig. 10 that if the conditions described in Proposition 6 are satisfied, then the price C(n) converges to the unique solution C * that maximizes the revenue.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have first described a framework of large population game with heterogeneous types of individuals, in which local interactions involve a random number of individuals of different types. We have developed the concept of evolutionary stability equilibrium as a solution that characterizes the game behavior. A decentralized virus protection problem has been used to motivate and illustrate this framework. In order to achieve desirable outcome of the game, we have developed methodologies to design a global controller for this dynamic heterogeneous population game. In particular, the interdependency between the global control and the population behaviors has been analyzed using coupled dynamics between approximate stochastic gradient algorithms with the replicator dynamics. We have provided a sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium with respect to the control parameter. We have shown the convergence of our learning algorithm, and provided numerical illustrations to demonstrate the impact of the heterogeneity on the outcome of the system. As a future work, we would like to investigate the data-driven reinforcement learning type of algorithms for as a global controller and also to generalize our results to a typedependent utility framework. In addition, we would develop statistical methods to estimate network parameters for practical case studies.
